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OUR 19TH CENTURY PATENT SYSTEM
Greg Reilly*

INTRODUCTION
The patent system is in flux. Concerns abound about the imperfect fit between traditional
patent rights and the Information Age, excessive numbers of patents, overbroad patent rights, poor
patent quality, and allegedly exploitative actors, like so-called “patent trolls.”1 In response, courts,
commentators, and Congress have proposed, debated, and sometimes adopted a series of reforms
and changes to patent rights, patent doctrines, and patent institutions. The America Invents Act of
2011 (AIA) introduced the most significant changes to the patent system since 1952 2 and was even
described by one commentator (hyperbolically, as we will see) as “the most significant overhaul
to our patent system since the founding fathers first conceived of codifying a grand bargain
between society and invention.” 3 The Supreme Court’s recent renewed interest in patent law 4 has
also resulted in significant changes, including abolishing the long-standing rule that “a patent
owner is entitled to permanent injunctive relief once a patent is adjudicated to be both valid and
infringed.”5 And scholars have proposed a variety of other significant changes to American patent
law.6
With change, comes opposition. The changes and proposed changes to patent law have
sparked vigorous policy debates about the effects on the patent system’s goals of promoting
innovation and preserving competition.7 But beyond policy disagreement, opponents also are
concerned that recent changes and proposed changes reflect a sharp, dramatic break with longstanding, fundamental aspects of the patent system. To them, departing from the historical features
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See Paul Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 279–280 (2015).
2
CRAIG ALLEN N ARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 26 (4th ed. 2017).
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David Kappos, Re-Inventing the U.S. Patent System, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: D AVID KAPPOS’ PUBLIC BLOG
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eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 189 (2007).
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IRVINE L. REV. 483, 485, 488–489 (2016) (describing renewed interest in a working requirement that would mandate
the patentee use its invention within the United States); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179–80 (2000) (proposing a fair use defense to patent law similar to that in
copyright); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1759–1760 (2011) (proposing
development of patent law through ex ante rulemaking in the Patent Office).
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See, e.g., Greg Dolin, The Costs of Patent “Reform”: The Abuse of the PTO’s Administrative Review Programs,
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of the patent system is inadvisable, 8 illegitimate,9 or even unconstitutional. 10
This Essay provides context necessary to evaluate these concerns. Recent changes and
proposed changes seem like a dramatic and sharp break with past practice precisely because the
patent system has been remarkably stable since the middle of the 19th century. To many in the
patent community, this contention may seem surprising, or even laughable, given widespread
recognition of significant adjustments and fluctuations in the patent system over the years. 11 The
patent system certainly undergoes doctrinal variations at the operational level of applying patent
law’s specific requirements to determine if particular patents are valid and infringed—for example,
the specific tests used or defenses available. 12 There also have been changes in how the patent
system is used over time, including the volume of patenting and patent enforcement activity. 13
But at a foundational or systemic level, the nature of the rights granted, the institutional
structure of the patent system, and the basic doctrines of patentability, infringement, and remedies
have remained largely constant. It is exactly because the foundational and systemic aspects of the
patent system have been so constant that the fluctuations in doctrinal implementation seem so
significant.14 For example, the proper test for determining whether an invention is too obvious to
warrant a patent, much debated in the patent community, would seem relatively minor compared
to a reform requiring the Patent Office to decide whether to issue a patent based on a case-by-case
determination of whether the innovation benefits of a particular patent outweigh its social costs.
Even the question of when inventions are patent ineligible abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural
phenomena—probably the most contested current patent issue—would become much less
significant if Congress started debating abolishing patents for some industries, imposing price
controls on patented products, setting mandatory licensing terms, or replacing the private right of
action for patent infringement with government enforcement.
But long-standing stability in the foundational and systemic characteristics of the patent
system does not mean that these characteristics are inevitable, necessary, or mandatory features.
To the contrary, in the first few decades of the American patent system, there was significant
change, experimentation, and development in the nature of patent rights, the patent system’s
8
See, e.g., Dana Rohrabacher, ‘Patent Reform’ Will Hurt Innovation, NATIONAL REVIEW (June 22, 2011,
8:00AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2011/06/patent-reform-will-hurt-innovation-dana-rohrabacher/
(opposing the switch to a first-to-file system because it would “overturn 200 years of legal precedent” that “for 200
years has protected inventors and fostered an environment of economic growth.”); see also, e.g., Maureen K.
Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the “Markets, Government, and the Common Good”
Conference:
Strong
Patent
Rights,
Strong
Economy
(Oct.
13,
2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1264483/ohlhausen_-_hillsdale_speech_10-1317.pdf (objecting to reforms to restrict patent rights on the basis of “over two hundred year history during which the
United States, driven by technological innovation, emerged as the world’s leading economy” based on historically
“strong intellectual property rights”).
9
See, e.g., James Edwards, A Patents as Property Rights History Lesson, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/07/patents-property-rights-history-lesson/id=87644/ (“[T]hat a patent is private
property affording the owner private property rights should be without question” due to “two centuries’ worth of
statutes and judicial rulings and patterns and practice operationalizing private property rights in patents.”).
10
See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Abbvie, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC
v. Greene’s Energy Group, (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2017) (No. 16-712), 2017 WL 3888200.
11
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2017).
12
Id. at 7–8, 10–11.
13
Id. at 3–6.
14
See id. at 51 (noting that the changes observed in the patent system may not be as dramatic as contended because
of the possibility of more radical changes, like a working requirement or exclusion of some technologies from patent
protection).
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institutional structure, and the basic doctrines of patent law. The foundational and systemic aspects
of the patent system that persist today emerged by the middle fifty years of the 19th century (1825–
1875). Thus, the characteristics of our modern patent system reflect less the influence of the
Framers or of the 18th century than they do the influence of the early to middle of the 19th century.
After establishing our 19th century patent system in Part I, Part II describes the
consequences that our 19th century patent system has for present policy debates over patent law.
A brief conclusion follows.
I.

RECOGNIZING OUR 19TH CENTURY PATENT SYSTEM

Commentators have recognized the 19th century origins of various aspects of the patent
system. For example, Professor Michael Burstein noted that “[t]he administrative structure of the
modern American patent system was first set forth in the Patent Act of 1836” and “has remained
largely unchanged.”15 Professor Adam Mossoff recognized that “[m]uch of modern American
patent law comprises doctrines first created by courts in the nineteenth century.”16 And a major
argument against the new powers the AIA gave the Patent Office to cancel issued patents is based
on historical stability in the nature of patent rights, namely the long-standing principle that a
“granted U.S. patent affords its owner a substantial property right”17 over which the government
has “relatively limited” control. 18
In fact, the last two comprehensive patent acts before the AIA—the Patent Act of 1870 and
the Patent Act of 1952—largely focused on reorganization and codification of judicial
developments, without making significant changes. 19 Development in patent law since the mid19th century thus has occurred through the common law process, naturally leading to incremental
development of the doctrinal formulations for implementing law but not foundational or systemic
changes that significantly depart from past practice. 20 This judicial development of patent law
helps explain the stability in the foundational aspects of the patent system. The common law
process allows flexibility to adjust doctrinal formulations to changing societal, technological, and
political needs, thereby relieving pressure that otherwise might provide an impetus for
foundational or systemic changes. 21
This Part provides a comprehensive view of how the foundational and systemic aspects of
the American patent system fluctuated significantly in the early years before stabilizing into their
present forms in the mid-19th century.
A.

The Nature of Patent Rights

1. General-Applicable Legislation with Uniform Criteria
American patent law is generalized and standardized, normally applying uniform criteria
15

Burstein, supra note 6, at 1761.
Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 321, 324 (2009).
17
Brief as Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of Neither Party at 3, Oil States
Energy Servs., LLC, INC. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, (No. 16-712) 2017 WL 3888207.
18
Brief Amici Curiae AbbVie, Inc. et al. at 14–15, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, INC. v. Greene’s Energy Grp.,
LLC, (No. 16-712) 2017 WL 3888207.
19
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 70–73 (2010).
20
Id. at 99–106 (noting that common law process is better at making incremental changes than significant
reforms).
21
Thanks to Chris Beauchamp for suggesting this point to me.
16
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enacted through general legislation to all inventors and inventions, rather than using special bills
or ad hoc criteria. 22 Though long-standing, this approach was not inevitable.
Initially, it appeared that American patents would follow their English, colonial, and state
predecessors as “discretionary ad hoc grants” by the crown or the legislature, issued on a case-bycase basis and differing in their terms, conditions, and duration. 23 The First Congress received
petitions from inventors, assuming an ad hoc approach, for exclusive rights in their inventions. 24
Both the House and the Senate appointed committees to review these petitions, which in some
instances recommended passing special bills to grant exclusive rights to the inventors based on a
case-by-case evaluation of the desirability of patent protection. 25 One special bill—for exclusive
rights to Francis Bailey for a printing press that prevented counterfeiting—even passed the House
but only after an individualized evaluation of its usefulness by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton.26
Congress never enacted these special bills, choosing instead to use general legislation to
provide exclusive rights to inventors. 27 The Patent Act of 1790 adopted an approach of
“generalization and standardization”: “general substantive criteria of patentability”; “standard,
uniform procedures for granting patents”; and “general uniform entitlements to be bestowed by all
patents.”28 Despite this early move towards generalization and standardization, the American
patent system retained significant elements of a discretionary, ad hoc approach to patents into the
middle of the 19th century.
First, early American patent law departed from generalization and standardization in its
treatment of foreign inventors. The Patent Act of 1793 limited patent protection to “citizens of the
United States,”29 while the Patent Act of 1800 gave noncitizens the same rights as citizens with
regards to patents, but only if they had lived in the United States for two years. 30 Congress
sometimes sidestepped this requirement by granting patent protection to foreign citizens via
private bills on a discretionary, ad hoc basis.31
The Patent Act of July 13, 1832 extended patent protection to any noncitizen residing in
the United States who declared an intention to become a citizen, but departed from the normally
standardized approach to patent protection by imposing additional requirements on those who
resided for less than two years, namely, that the patent rights shall “become absolutely void without
resort to any legal process to annul or cancel the same” if the invention was not publicly used in
the United States or if the patentee did not become a citizen. 32 The Patent Act of 1836 eliminated
22

Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent, 37 HARV. J.
of private patent bills”
that led it to incorporate special requests into generally-applicable legislation).
23
OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 17901909, 16–17, 25–26, 31 (Cambridge University Press 2016).
24
EDWARD C. W ALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, 82–83 n.4 (1998).
25
Id. at 83 (describing House committee report recommending exclusive rights in maps, globes, etc. to inventor
of new means of determining longitude); id. at 118–119 (describing Senate committee report recommending exclusive
rights for new printing press that prevented counterfeiting).
26
Id. at 116-117 (describing H.R. 44, which passed the House on March 4, 1790).
27
Id. at 84, 120.
28
BRACHA, supra note 23, at 193.
29
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1 Stat. 100.
30
Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 1 Stat. 37.
31
Merges & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 61 & n.67.
32
Patent Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, Stat. 577.
ON LEGIS. 45, 61–62 (2000) (describing “a tradition of congressional unease with the legislation
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this automatic cancellation for nonuse but made it a defense in infringement litigation that a foreign
patentee “had failed and neglected for the space of eighteen months from the date of the patent, to
put and continue on sale to the public, on reasonable terms” the patented invention. 33 This last
significant remnant of non-standardized and discriminatory treatment of noncitizens was dropped
in the Patent Act of 1870. 34
The second major departure from generalization and standardization in early American
patent law was Congress’s grants of patent term extensions on a discretionary basis via private
bills.35 Over the first half of the 19th century, there was an “evolution of ad hoc legislation into a
system of regularized procedures subject to judicial review.” 36 The Patent Act of July 3, 1832
provided a procedure by which to seek term extensions from Congress, though without imposing
any standardized criteria for granting extensions.37 The Patent Act of 1836 made this even more
standardized by providing a procedure for obtaining an extension through the Patent Office based
on specific criteria, namely, that the inventor failed to obtain “a reasonable remuneration for the
time, ingenuity, and expense” of inventing and commercializing the invention (as shown by
specific evidence of costs and profits).38 Amendments to the patent statutes in 1861 abolished
patent term extensions, offering a single term of 17 years for all patents. 39 Private bills for patent
term extensions continued to be sought from Congress but were apparently rarely granted and the
practice died out towards the end of the 19th century.40
2. Strong Exclusionary Property Interest
An issued patent today creates a strong property interest in the patentee, providing a nearabsolute right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the disclosed invention, without
policy-based third-party use rights or compulsory licensing. 41 “[T]his identification of patents as
property itself reflects a long-standing historical treatment of patents in both Congress and the
courts,”42 but one that emerged only in the early 19th century.
Pre-Constitution, patents were royal prerogatives or government entitlements, not property
rights.43 The rights they conveyed varied, they were inalienable and personal to the grantee, and

33

Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15 Stat. 117,123.
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61 Stat. 198, 208.
35
Richard M. Cooper, Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 59, 60 (1993).
36
Merges & Reynolds, supra note 2222, at 61.
37
Patent Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 2 Stat. 559.
38
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 317, § 18 Stat. 117, 124.
39
Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, § 16 Stat. 246, 249.
40
Cooper, supra note 35, at 60–61.
41
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015); 35 U.S.C. § 261(2013); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,
423-424 (1908) (explaining that Congress has long “provide[d] for an exclusive right to inventors to make, use and
vend their inventions” with almost “no qualification . . . of the right”). Limited prior user rights defenses have existed
on-and-off in American patent law from 1839 until today. See Jeff Mikrut, How the America Invents Act Revived the
Prior-User Defense, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/winter2012-prior-user-defense-americainvents-act.html.
42
Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege
in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1010 (2007) (emphasis added). Patents originally gave a right to
practice the invention, and there is dispute when this morphed into merely a right to exclude. Mossoff, Exclusion,
supra note 16, at 339–347.
43
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 24, at 9–10.
34

5

they could be revoked at the discretion of the sovereign. 44 The early petitions to Congress seeking
patents via private bills assumed American patents would similarly confer government benefits,
not property rights.45 The Patent Act of 1790 started the move towards patents as property rights
by providing a uniform right to exclude and only allowing revocation within one year of issuance
on grounds of fraud or non-novelty.46 However, the 1790 Act made no mention of property rights
nor the alienability of patent rights (though it did reference the patentee’s assignees).47 It was the
Patent Act of 1793 that first described the patent as providing “an exclusive property in the”
invention and permitted the patentee “to assign the title and interest in the said invention, at any
time.”48 By the early 19th century, “references to patents as property [we]re omnipresent in
nineteenth-century patent law.”49
Relatedly, the strong, near-absolute exclusionary right offered by patents was not
inevitable. In fact, the Senate passed an amendment to the bill that became the Patent Act of 1790
providing for a system of compulsory licensing if the inventor did not sell the invention in
sufficient quantity or at a reasonable price, but Congress ultimately rejected this amendment out
of practical concerns about setting the royalty rate.50 By the middle of the 19th century, patents
were viewed as providing strong rights to their owners, as “courts provided patents with expansive
procedural guarantees, adopting canons of liberal construction for both patents and the patent
statutes” and Congress “adopted expansive substantive patent doctrines jurisprudence.” 51 Despite
repeated requests, Congress never instituted a system of compulsory licensing of patented
inventions.52 And although the federal government initially “avoided liability for its use of a patent
by relying on sovereign immunity,” by the late 19th century, several mechanisms existed to
enforce patent rights against the federal government and it was suggested that the patent “confers
upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or
used by the government itself, without just compensation.” 53
3. Near-Complete Patent Owner Discretion Over Patent Rights
The patentee’s right to make, use, and sell products that embody the patented invention is
subject to the states’ general police powers, notwithstanding the federal patent. 54 However,
American patent law historically has left it to the patentee to decide what to do with its patent
rights with virtually no qualification. 55
English, colonial, and state patents normally included a variety of restrictions and
regulations on the patentee’s rights, such as working requirements that mandated practicing the
invention within the territory; regulation of price and quality of the patented invention; and

44

BRACHA, supra note 23, at 16–18, 26.
Id. at 192.
46
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7 §§ 1, 4–5 Stat.100, 111.
47
See id. § 1.
48
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11 § 1, 4 Stat. 318, 322.
49
Mossoff, Who Cares, supra note 42, at 992–993.
50
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 24, at 139–141 & n. 107.
51
Mossoff, Who Cares, supra note 42, at 998.
52
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417 (1945).
53
Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Contractors Under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 399, 408–411 (1995).
54
Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 506, 507 (1878) (emphasis added).
55
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423–424 (1908) (emphasis added).
45
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mandatory training of apprentices to practice the invention in the territory. 56 By contrast, Congress
from the beginning did not regulate most patentee’s use of their patents. 57 But, early on, it
sometimes exercised its power to do so. Congress for a time regulated foreign citizens’ patent
rights,58 requiring in the Patent Act of 1832 that foreigners introduce their invention in the United
States and become citizens to retain their patent protection 59 and providing a defense to
infringement based on the foreign patentee’s non-use of the invention in the Patent Act of 1836. 60
The regulation of foreign patentees’ use of their patents ended with the Patent Act of 1870. 61
B.
1.

The Institutional Structure of the Patent System

The Dominance of Federal Law and Federal Courts

Federal law and federal courts have been the dominant force in patent law for so long that
it would be easy to assume it has always been this way. 62 Indeed, some recent reform efforts have
been questioned exactly because they depart from federal law and federal court dominance of
patent law.63 But in three significant ways, viable alternatives existed to the dominance of federal
law and federal courts until the early to mid-nineteenth century.
First, in the early years of the American patent system, parallel state patent systems were
thought permissible and even existed to some extent. 64 Several states granted their own patents in
the years after the Patent Act of 1790 created the federal patent system. 65 Concurrent state patent
power was endorsed by some courts and leading commentators in the early 19th century but never
explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court. 66 For unclear reasons, state patents disappeared at the
start of the 19th century, with what seems to be the last state patent granted in 1798 and extended
several times in the early 1800s.67
Second, patent litigation has long been assigned exclusively to federal courts, a notable
exception to the general presumption that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
matters of federal law.68 By contrast, under the Patent Act of 1790, state courts apparently had
exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement cases, as the 1790 Act did not specify federal
jurisdiction and there was no general federal question jurisdiction at the time. 69 The Patent Act of
1793 explicitly provided for concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction. 70 Although not entirely
56

BRACHA, supra note 23, at 26; id. at 18–19.
Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 425, 429.
58
See id. at 429.
59
Patent Act of July 13, 1832, 4 Stat. 577 (repealed 1836).
60
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, § 15.
61
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, § 61.
62
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 11, 12 (describing “the federal
government’s absolute authority over the patent system”).
63
See id. at 12-13 (describing debate and concerns about increased state involvement in patent law).
64
See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez-Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45
(2013) (discussing presence and acceptance of state patents in the early American patent system).
65
Id. at 76-77.
66
Id. at 81-93 (describing endorsement of concurrent state patent powers by New York’s highest court and Justice
Story in his commentaries).
67
Id. at 76-80.
68
Gugliuzza, supra note 62, at 12, 17.
69
Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation,
46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 635-636 (1971).
70
Id. at 636.
57
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clear and subject to some debate, revisions to the patent statutes in 1800 seemed to make federal
jurisdiction exclusive. 71 Thus, after significant early variation, “it became the established rule in
1800, maintained to this day, that federal jurisdiction over infringement actions is exclusive of the
state courts.”72
Third, beyond simply resolving patent disputes, federal courts long have been the dominant
actor in developing patent law and policy. 73 Congress was actively involved in shaping patent law
in the early years, engaging in three substantial restructurings of patent law in the first half century
of the patent system. 74 Subsequently, however, “[t]he history of substantive legislative action in
patent law is . . . largely one of obeisance,” with “congressional action . . . be[ing] an exercise in
codification of judicial pronouncements or a locking-in of innovations emanating from the patent
bar and other interested stakeholders.”75 Moreover, the Patent Office is a comparatively weak
administrative agency, traditionally only charged with the comparatively routine task of factspecific evaluations of patent applications for compliance with the criteria of patentability and with
little role in making policy decisions or developing the substantive legal criteria for patent
protection.76 Thus, federal judges have long been “the principal architects” and “traditional policy
driver[s]” of the patent system.77
Indeed, the most significant changes to the institutional structure of the patent system from
the 19th century until recently occurred solely within the federal courts. Appellate review of both
patent examination and patent litigation has shifted among various federal courts over the years,
most notably with the centralization of all patent appeals in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in the early 1980s. 78 Additionally, there have been multiple swings in the degree
to which juries have been involved in patent cases over the years. 79 In contrast to these changes
within the federal courts, the relationship of federal courts to other institutional actors remained
largely stable from the early to mid-19th century until recently.
2.

Pre-Issuance Examination

The Patent Office’s substantive, pre-issuance examination of patent applications for
compliance with the statutory criteria of patentability so familiar today 80 only emerged after an
initial period of significant instability in the institutional structure of the patent system.
Traditionally, patents had been granted in England, the colonies, and the states by petition
to the sovereign or legislature, which evaluated the petition to determine whether to issue a
patent.81 By contrast, the earliest proposed American patent legislation would have created a
registration system for patents similar to that then-developing in England. 82 Under this approach,
71
Id. at 636-637; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 62, at 18-19 (describing the uncertainty in this conclusion);
Edward H. Cooper, State Law of Patent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. REV. 313, 317-318 & nn.13-19 (1972).
72
Chisum, supra note 69, at 637.
73
Nard, supra note 19, at 53-55.
74
Id. at 64-70.
75
Id. at 53-54.
76
Burstein, supra note 6, at 1755, 1757.
77
Nard, supra note 19, at 54-55.
78
See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 UNIV. OF ILL. L. REV. 387, 389393 (describing some of these appellate variations).
79
Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848, 912-913 (2016).
80
Burstein, supra note 6, at 1755–56.
81
BRACHA, supra note 23, at 17, 27–28.
82
Id. at 22 (describing developing registration system in England).
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the inventor filed a petition describing the invention and provided notice of the invention in
newspapers, and if no one objected within a specified time, the patent would issue, examined only
for compliance with formalities rather than substantive issues. 83 But the Patent Act of 1790
ultimately provided for a three-member board of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and
Attorney General to evaluate patent applications.84
The significant demands this system imposed on high-ranking officials led the Patent Act
of 1793 to abandon the examination system in favor of “a pro forma process dependent only on
completion of the required ministerial acts by the petitioner for the patent.”85 Omitting the notice
and opportunity to object provisions previously proposed, the 1793 Act left all patentability
questions to the courts, either in resolving defenses to infringement suits or resolving direct actions
to cancel a patent that could be brought within three years of issuance. 86
Facing concerns about an over-proliferation of weak patents, Congress again altered the
process for obtaining a patent in the Patent Act of 1836, creating “the examination system that has
remained a fundamental part of the patent law to this day.” 87 Beginning in 1836 and continuing to
this day, an inventor desiring patent protection must file an application with the Patent Office, an
administrative agency staffed with civil servant examiners charged with reviewing patent
applications for compliance with the statutory requirements. 88 If the application is denied by the
examiner, the applicant can appeal within the Patent Office.89 The applicant has the additional
options of taking a direct appeal to federal court or filing a separate lawsuit in federal court. 90
3.

Patents as of Right

A patent applicant has a statutory right to receive a patent upon satisfaction of statutory
criteria that are directed exclusively to technical considerations: novelty and non-obviousness,
eligible subject matter and utility, and adequate disclosure. 91 The Patent Office has no discretion
to weigh policy or economic considerations or weigh costs and benefits of individual patents to
grant a patent where the technical criteria are not satisfied or deny protection where they are. 92
This fundamental aspect of the modern patent system was an innovation of the early American
patent system.
No right to a patent existed in the pre-Constitution English, colonial, or state practice, and
patents were instead issued at the discretion of the sovereign. 93 The 1790 Act did not create any
greater right to a patent than under the pre-Constitutional practice, stating only that “it shall and
may be lawful” for the patent board to issue a patent without requiring it to do so.94 It expressly
83
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required discretionary, policy-based decision making, permitting patent issuance only if the patent
board “deem[ed] the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important.” 95 And no right of
appeal, means of review, or remedy was provided for an unsuccessful patent applicant. 96 The 1790
Act did mark the beginning of the American patent system’s road to a statutory right to patent
protection by defining standardized criteria for patentability for the patent board to apply,
standardized rights granted by a patent, and a standardized process for obtaining a patent.97
The Patent Act of 1793 represented a significantly larger step towards a non-discretionary
right to a patent. Although it only stated that “it shall and may be lawful” to issue a patent, it was
widely understood as mandating patent issuance upon satisfaction of a few formalities, without
any government discretion to deny the petition. 98 Yet, the patent applicant still had no enforceable
right to a patent, as the statute omitted any right to appeal, means of review, or remedy if an
applicant was denied patent protection. 99 Additionally, some courts used the 1793 Act’s utility
requirement to perform the patent board’s prior role of evaluating the social value and costs of the
invention.100
By the end of 1830s, patents took their modern form as a right of anyone who satisfied the
statutory criteria, without any discretion or policy-weighing. The Patent Act of 1836 expressly
provided that “it shall be [the Commissioner of Patent’s] duty to issue a patent therefor” if the
examination determined that the invention satisfied the statutory criteria. 101 Although the 1836 Act
maintained language allowing the Commissioner to determine if the invention was “sufficiently
useful and important,” the Patent Office never treated this language as giving it open-ended
discretion to evaluate the social value or costs and benefits of inventions.102 The 1836 Act also
gave a dissatisfied applicant the opportunity to appeal to a board of disinterested experts, requiring
the Commissioner to justify the refusal and giving the board the power to overrule the
commissioner.103 The Patent Act of 1839 completed the move to patents as non-discretionary
rights, allowing the patentee to enforce this right in the courts by either appealing the
Commissioner’s decision to the federal district court or by filing a bill of equity seeking patent
issuance.104
The Patent Office’s Limited Post-Issuance Role

4.

For most of the history of the American patent system, the Patent Office had a limited role
after patent issuance, with no involvement in enforcement of the patent or re-evaluating the validity
of issued patents. 105 The Patent Office’s role has expanded over the past few decades, with
Congress first creating reexamination procedures for the Patent Office to review and cancel issued
patents and then significantly expanding these powers in the AIA.106 This expanded role for the
Patent Office is controversial exactly because it departs from the Patent Office’s historically
95
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limited post-issuance role.107
Traditionally, in England, post-issuance patent issues were, in part, the province of the
executive, i.e., the crown, acting through its council of advisors, the Privy Council. Competitors
could petition the Privy Council seeking annulment of previously granted patents, while patentees
could petition the Privy Council seeking to have infringers tried before the Council for contempt
of the royal grant. 108 Over the course of the 18th century, post-issuance patent issues increasingly
shifted to the courts, 109 and the Privy Council largely abandoned any post-issuance role by the end
of the century.110
Initially, the American patent system gave the executive no post-issuance role. Under both
the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793, patentees had a private right of action for infringement in the
courts, and competitors could ask the courts to cancel issued patents either in defense of an
infringement suit or in direct annulment actions in the courts, but the executive branch had no role
in the enforcement, review, or regulation of issued patents. 111 Indeed, for a period, the executive’s
pre-issuance role had no impact on post-issuance patents. The 1790 Act provided that issuance of
the patent constituted prima facie evidence of its validity, 112 but under the registration system of
the 1793 Act, “a patent was not received in courts of justice as even prima facie evidence that the
invention patented was new or useful.”113
Over the first few decades of the 19th century, the Patent Office took on the limited postissuance role that it held until recently. First, without substantive pre-issuance examination under
the 1793 Act, patentees increasingly discovered validity problems post-issuance and returned to
the Patent Office seeking to surrender their original patent and receive a replacement amended to
address the problem.114 The Patent Office began granting such reissue requests in the 1810s,115
and Congress codified it in 1832.116 The reissue practice remains essentially the same today,
though with several limits on broadening claim scope that the Supreme Court introduced in the
late 19th century.117
Second, the Patent Act of 1836 expanded the Patent Office’s power to resolve
interferences—contests between competing claimants of the same invention to determine who is
entitled to the patent—to cover not just interferences between pending applications but also
interferences between pending applications and issued patents. 118 This interference power
continued until it was abolished by the AIA, though in 1952, Congress granted the Patent Office
the power to directly cancel issued patents that lost in interferences rather than requiring a separate
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court action.119
Third, even in the decade or two before the return to pre-issuance examination in the 1836
Act, courts began to emphasize that patents should be treated liberally and in favor of their
validity.120 Under the examination system of the 1836 Act, the Patent Office’s actions in granting
the patent once again became prima facie evidence of its validity post-issuance with the burden on
the defendant in litigation to establish invalidity. 121 From the antebellum era until today, issued
patents have been presumed valid in litigation, with the defendant required to provide clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity. 122
C.

The Substantive Doctrines of Patent Law

1. The Statutory Criteria of Patentability
Despite the traditional absence of uniform standards for patents, the basic statutory criteria
of patentability emerged early in the American patent system. 123 The basic doctrinal framework of
patentability has remained the same since the mid-1800s, even as the courts have engaged in
common law development to flesh out and implement that framework.
The Patent Act of 1790 included the basic requirements of novelty, utility, and
enablement.124 “The enablement standard has exhibited markedly little evolution since the days of
Justice Story [in the early 1800s].” 125 By the Patent Act of 1836, the novelty requirement had taken
the form it would have into the 21st century: judging novelty as of the date of the invention,
requiring that the invention not be previously known or used in the United States or patented or
described in a printed publication anywhere in the world, and providing that a patentee lost its right
to an invention by publicly using or selling the invention too long before filing the patent
application.126 And by the time of the Civil War, the utility requirement had evolved into its
modern form that requires only a minimal showing of some real-world use rather than the more
open-ended evaluation of its social value or importance that had been used in the early 1800s.127
Even the patentability doctrines most controversial in recent years developed, at least in
their basic form, by the mid-19th century. The basic statutory categories of eligible subject
matter—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—have existed virtually
unchanged since the Patent Act of 1793,128 and the judicially-created exceptions against patenting
laws of nature, products of nature, and abstract ideas “have defined the reach of the statute as a
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years” to an 1853 decision. 129 Likewise, the basic
119
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requirement that the invention be non-obvious—not just new but significantly different and a nontrivial change to a skilled artisan—originated in an 1851 Supreme Court case, 130 if not before.131
Finally, the Federal Circuit recently explained that “since 1793, the Patent Act has expressly stated
that an applicant must provide a written description of the invention, and after the 1836 Act added
the requirement for claims, the Supreme Court applied this description requirement separate from
enablement.”132
The last patentability requirement to develop was the requirement that the patentee
“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter” of the invention. 133 Under the
1793 Act, patentees began voluntarily including claims as a distinct component of the specification
to distinguish their invention from the prior art, and the 1836 Act codified this procedure to some
extent.134 In adopting the modern language in 1870, Congress formalized the growing practice of
peripheral claiming—precisely claiming the invention to signal the outer bounds of the right—that
had replaced the prior practice of central claiming—describing the primary embodiment and then
asserting rights to a surrounding zone of equivalents. 135 American patent law continues to use the
peripheral claiming practice adopted in 1870, 136 while “[t]he 1870 Act’s definiteness requirement
survives today, largely unaltered.” 137
2. Infringement
Under modern patent law, liability for infringement requires that the defendant make, use,
sell, offer to sell, or import the claimed invention or its equivalent. 138 Liability for offering to sell
and for importing the invention was added in the 1990s as part of harmonization of American
patent law with international patent law.139 Otherwise, the infringement doctrine remains largely
the same as in the mid-1800s.
The 1790 Act gave patentees a claim for infringement against those who “make, construct,
use, employ, or vend,” while the 1793 Act modified these acts of infringement to “make, devise
and use, or sell” and the 1836 Act adopted the acts of “making, using, or selling” that would remain
the same until the 1990s. 140 Through the middle of the century, when central claiming was the
dominant approach, determining whether the accused product was infringing involved determining
the key features of the invention from the patent as a whole and then determining whether the
accused product was close enough to the invention. 141 But with the formalization of claims in the
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1870 Act and the move to peripheral claiming in the 1870s, 142 infringement required a showing
that the accused product fell within the language of the claim, as it does today. 143
To be fair, although peripheral claiming has existed since the 1870s, the process of
interpreting claim language for purposes of infringement and invalidity arguably has changed
significantly in the twenty years since the Supreme Court held that claim construction was a matter
for the judge, not the jury, in Markman v. Westview Instruments.144 The past two decades have
seen prior practice of treating interpretation of the claims as part of the infringement or invalidity
inquiry (and often leaving it to the jury) replaced by so-called Markman hearings, pre-trial
proceedings where the judge explicitly defines the claim language. 145 Markman hearings have
become the most important event in patent litigation and may have substantively changed the
methodology and outcomes of patent claim interpretation. 146
Finally, the liability for infringement not just for products that are the same as the claimed
invention but also for those that are equivalent developed out of the favorable treatment courts
gave patentees in the first half of the 19th century, when they focused on the principle of the
invention and asked whether the accused product was substantially the same. 147 With the rise of
claims towards the middle of the century, courts increasingly asked whether the accused product
fell within the exact scope of the claims and, if not, whether equitable considerations warranted
expanding the scope of the claim to cover the accused product. 148 The doctrine of equivalents in
its modern form is generally traced to an 1853 case. 149
3. Remedies
Precursors to American patents often specified the penalty for infringement, which varied
from patent-to-patent, for example, half the value of infringing sales; three times the value of
infringing sales; the greater of twenty pounds per infringing product or the value of the infringing
product; and replevin of the infringing products.150
The Patent Act of 1790 departed from these types of liquidated damages provisions by
permitting the patentee to recover generally “such damages as shall be assessed by a jury.”151 The
Patent Act of 1793 standardized damages at an amount “that shall be at least equal to three times
the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed” the patented invention (modified by
the Patent Act of 1800 to be three times the actual damages sustained). 152 Since the Patent Act of
1836, the patentee’s “actual damages” have been the base measure of what the patentee is entitled
to recover.153 Measuring damages by the established royalty rate or the patentee’s lost profits from
142
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selling the product emerged in the early 19th century and remain measures of damages today. 154
The most common measure of damages today—a reasonable royalty—emerged at the end of the
19th century.155
Beyond compensatory damages, the judge in an infringement suit has had discretion since
the Patent Act of 1836 to award up to three times the actual damages in cases involving willful
infringement.156 And the Patent Act of 1819 introduced equity jurisdiction in American patent
cases, along with the “authority to grant injunctions, according to the course and principles of
courts of equity.”157 Subsequently, “[f]rom at least the early 19th century, courts have granted
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.” 158
II.

EVALUATING OUR 19TH CENTURY PATENT SYSTEM

The modern American patent system thus reflects the stabilizing of fundamental and
systemic characteristics in the middle of the 19th century, following significant change and
diversity in the first fifty years. Turning to the consequences of the descriptive account provided
in Part I, this Part suggests that the long-standing foundational and systemic stability may explain
why patent law is seemingly impervious to the doctrinal variations that occur but also introduces
inconsistencies between patent law and the modern legal world and results in mistaken
assumptions that familiar features of the patent system are somehow mandatory and inevitable and
therefore beyond the power of Congress to alter.
A.

Our 19th Century Patent System & Patent Stability

Our 19th century patent system may help explain Professor Mark Lemley’s recent
observation that “[t]he patent system . . . seems surprisingly resilient to changes in the law,” with
“the data show[ing] very little evidence that patent owners and challengers are behaving differently
because of changes in the law.” 159 Lemley identifies several possible explanations for this
resiliency: selection effects, economic trends, irrelevance of the merits to behavior in the patent
system, and irrelevance of formal patent law to behavior in the patent system. 160
Recognizing the 19th century nature of our patent system offers another possible
explanation: the patent system has not experienced the “truly dramatic change” that Professor
Lemley suggests. 161 Professor Lemley describes “multiple swings between eras of strong and weak
patent protection”162 that have occurred at the operational level of the specific tests and defenses
that govern doctrinal requirements, such as obviousness, exceptions to patent-eligible subject
matter, the doctrine of equivalents, calculation of damages, and availability of attorneys’ fees.163
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The reason that these fluctuations in operational aspects of patent law “don’t seem to be enough
to change the overall dynamics of the system” 164 may be that they are actually marginal changes
to the patent system—“however dramatic the changes in patent doctrine seem to those of us inside
the system”165—when considered in the larger context of the remarkable stability of the patent
system’s foundational and systemic aspects discussed in Part I.
Professor Lemley recognizes that “[s]ome might contest the claim that the changes we have
made to the patent system in the last forty years are as dramatic as I suggest,” as I do in this Essay,
and envisions that “more radical changes—a working requirement for patents, or excluding
software entirely from patent protection”—that is, departures from the long-standing structural and
systemic features discussed in Part I—might be “radical enough to bump the patent system out of
its established track.”166 Yet, Professor Lemley ultimately rejects stability in the foundational
aspects of the patent system as an explanation for the patent system’s resiliency, concluding instead
that “patent institutions seem to have taken on a life of their own, one largely beyond the reach of
the policy levers we employ to try to calibrate innovation incentives.” 167
Professor Lemley’s conclusion certainly could be right. As he notes, “[w]e haven’t tried
those things [i.e., changes to the foundational and systemic aspects of the patent system discussed
in Part I], so we don’t know how the system would react.”168 Moreover, the value to businesses
from patents may not come from the formal legal rights, substantive doctrines, and institutional
structure that surround them but rather, for example, the signals they provide or the transactions
they facilitate.169 But this Essay suggests an alternative possibility—that we are not using the right
“policy levers” if truly want to calibrate the patent system in a way that will change the balance
between innovation incentives and competition in a truly significant way, rather than just at the
margins (a question on which this Essay takes no position). Rather, to alter the patent system’s
basic balance, more focus might need to be given to reforming the foundational and systemic
aspects of the patent system, rather than just tweaking substantive patent law at the operational
level of doctrinal implementation.
B.

Our 19th Century Patent System & the Modern Legal Landscape

The 19th century nature of the patent system creates tensions in the modern legal world,
resulting in complications in the theoretical justifications, doctrines, rhetoric, and institutional
structure of the modern patent system.
Today, “courts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law is
utilitarian,” rather than moral right, reward, or distributive justice: “[w]e grant patents in order to
promote innovation, and so we should grant patents only to the extent necessary to encourage such
innovation.”170 By contrast, for most of the 19th century, patent theory included concerns of
fairness—giving inventors exclusive rights as a reward for their labor and preventing competitors
from unjustly enriching themselves by using an invention without paying for it. 171 These fairness
concerns reflected “an era dominated by the labor theory of property and the social contract
164
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doctrine of natural rights philosophy.” 172 From this perspective, patents were seen as securing the
property right that inventors gained in their invention through their mental labor. 173 Thus, “much
of the early evolution of American patent law resulted from patents being treated as a civil right
within the then-dominant political and constitutional context of natural rights philosophy.” 174
The continued stability of the foundational and systemic aspects of the patent system
despite this changing theoretical justification has important consequences for modern patent law.
First, aspects of the patent system that developed in the 19th century based on fairness or natural
law-type principles remain today, proving problematic and controversial under modern utilitarian
justifications for patent law. Professors Meurer and Nard recognized this problem with regards to
the doctrine of equivalents, which developed based on fairness concerns and has proven
problematic and theoretically unmoored in the modern patent system. 175
Second, despite the well-established utilitarian basis for the modern patent system, the
rhetoric of fairness, reward, and natural law still influence patent law debates, with those making
such arguments often relying on cases from the first half or so of the 19th century to support their
contentions.176 Indeed, the deep divide among patent stakeholders about whether patent
cancellation is a public right that constitutionally can be assigned to an administrative agency, as
the AIA’s new post-issuance review proceedings do, or a private right that is more properly
resolved by Article III courts is at least partially due to the disconnect between our 19th century
patent system and the modern legal world. Those defending AIA post-issuance proceedings
emphasize the modern, utilitarian concept of patents, arguing, for example, that because
“[i]nventors are entitled to patents only for inventions that further the public interest,” these
proceedings serve “important public purposes . . . namely the protection of the public from private
monopolies that exceed the bounds authorized by Congress.”177 Those opposed to the AIA
proceedings emphasize conceptions from the 19th century of rewarding and protecting the inventor
by making issued patents the exclusive property of the patent owner beyond the government’s
control or the Patent Office’s purview. 178
Third, patent protection is a government intervention into the economy that restricts the
normal operation of the free market. 179 Yet, the foundational and systemic aspects of the patent
system developed in the 19th century before extensive administrative regulation and have
remained essentially the same despite the development of the modern regulatory state. 180 The
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patent system therefore does not operate on modern concepts of administrative regulation but
rather through the private law mechanisms of contract, property, and tort that dominated in the
19th century.181 This creates a disconnect between patent law and the modern administrative state.
The patent system does not function based on a broad delegation of power to the Patent Office to
use its expertise to develop optimal standards, but rather requires the Patent Office to simply apply
the standards developed primarily by courts to specific patent applications. 182 Because Congress
has not traditionally provided substantive rulemaking authority to the Patent Office, its
determinations of questions of patent law have not received the deference typical for modern
administrative agencies.183 And until the Supreme Court resolved the question in 1999, there was
debate about whether the Patent Office was even subject to the Administrative Procedures Act that
governs the rest of the modern administrative state. 184
C.

Our 19th Century Patent System & Patent Change

The core normative question that arises from recognizing the 19th century nature of our
patent system—and is at the center of many of the debates over recent reforms or proposed reforms
to the patent system—is whether the patent system should be updated to reflect the modern
economy and modern legal world 185 or should retain its 19th-century characteristics, even if now
exceptional as compared to other areas of law. 186 A normative conclusion on this question is
beyond the scope of this Essay and may vary for different aspects of the patent system. But
recognizing that the roots of our patent system lie in the 19th century can provide useful insights
into on-going debates about whether, and to what extent, long-standing foundational aspects of the
patent system should be altered.
That so much of the patent system has been stable for so long is certainly a relevant
consideration that weighs against fundamental changes to the patent system. After all, “a page of
history is worth a volume of logic.” 187 That Congress has consistently “continued [a] policy
through many years” allows us to “assume that experience has demonstrated its wisdom and
beneficial effect upon the arts and sciences.” 188 This is particularly true because of the need to “be
cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing
community.”189 Thus, changes to the fundamental and systemic aspects of the patent system that
have remained stable since the mid-1800s should not be undertaken lightly. 190
Yet, opponents of reform go too far in suggesting that the fundamental and systemic aspects
developed in the 19th century are inevitable, necessary, or mandated by the Constitution or
Framers. For example, a patent owners’ group argued that the AIA post-issuance review
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proceedings “violate[] precedent and common law traditions mandating that patent owners’
property rights be protected by courts of law and juries.” 191 It described a modern, regulatory
approach to patents as a “meager conception of patent rights [that] contravenes centuries of English
jurisprudential tradition, which guards patents as one of the fundamentally most important forms
of private property . . .”192 Other stakeholders argued that “[a] granted patent necessarily carries
with it a judicially-enforceable right to exclude others from the use of a claimed invention.”193 And
a group of pharmaceutical companies contended that “the role envisioned [by the Framers] for
Congress with respect to patents was relatively limited.”194 On a similar view, an industry
organization suggested that Congress could not enact compulsory licensing or “restrict the transfer
or licensing of patents” because “[p]atents have traditionally been afforded the same constitutional
protections as other private property.” 195
These arguments mistake the long-standing, stable characteristics of the patent system as
mandatory features of the patent system and treat the 19th century approach to patents as the only
legitimate approach. In doing so, they overlook the significant changes and the diversity of
approaches in the first fifty years of the patent system. Many of the proposed departures from the
19th century patent system that circulate in patent debates today have historical antecedents in the
first fifty years of the patent system, including: executive discretion in issuing patents; greater
consideration of whether particular patents are economically and socially warranted; tailored, nonstandardized patent law; treating patents as entitlements or benefits, not property rights;
termination of patent rights without court involvement; the absence of injunctive relief; working
requirements; regulations on price or other uses of the patented invention; and compulsory
licensing.
None of this is to suggest that adopting any of these particular reforms—or even departing
from the 19th century characteristics of the patent system generally—is advisable. Again, that
question is beyond the scope of this Essay. Rather, while the long-standing stability in the patent
system dating to the middle of the 19th century counsels caution in making fundamental reforms
to the patent system, the instability and diversity of approaches in the first fifty years of the patent
system demonstrate that our 19th century patent system is neither inevitable nor mandatory.
CONCLUSION
One’s view of the patent system depends on what perspective is taken. A narrow focus on
the operational level of doctrinal implementation of patent law reveals significant instability and
fluctuation in the patent system. A broader focus on the foundational and systemic characteristics
of the patent system reveals such substantial stability for so long that the American patent system
reasonably can be described as a 19th century patent system. And an even broader focus on the
entire history of the American patent system reveals that this stability was only achieved after a
period of significant change, diversity, and experimentation in the first few decades of the patent
system. The result is a patent system disconnected in significant ways from the modern legal
system but one that could be justified on the basis of stability, resilience, and the assumed wisdom
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of long-standing practice. At the same time, however, mistaking this long-standing practice and
potential policy desirability for necessary, inherent, or mandatory features overlooks the
instability, change, and diversity in the early decades of the American patent system.
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